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Abstract—This paper presents a novel approach to increase
the performance bounds of image steganography under the
criteria of minimizing distortion. The proposed approach utilizes
a steganalysis convolutional neural network (CNN) framework
to understand an image’s model and embed in less detectable
regions to preserve the model. In other word, the trained
steganalysis CNN is used to calculate derivatives of the statistical
model of an image with respect to embedding changes. The ex-
perimental results show that the proposed algorithm outperforms
previous state-of-the-art methods in a wide range of low relative
payloads when compared with HUGO, S-UNIWARD, and HILL
by the state-of-the-art steganalysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
Steganography is used for a wide range of application such
as securely storing sensitive data, e.g. system passwords or
keys, within other files, communication privacy by hiding its
existence, and also watermarking application. Watermarking is
important in its own way as it is used in copyright protection,
source tracking, and authentication purposes, and etc.
In steganography problem, modeled by the prisoners prob-
lem [1], a hidden message is embedded by Alice in a cover
medium with a private or public key, producing a stego
medium from which the message should be decodable by Bob,
without raising any suspicion from the warden, Wendy. Wendy
can also alter the stego message to prevent any communication
in case of being an active warden. However, we are only con-
sidering the case of passive warden, whose goal is to reveal the
existence of any hidden message. Security of a steganography
method is measured by how difficult the disclosing is for the
warden or the steganalyzer, formally formulated in [2], where
Cachin defines perfectly secure and ǫ-secure steganography.
Further investigation from information theoretic point of view
was done by Moulin et al. [3], [4], where theoretic bounds
were calculated for both cases which can be reached by
cover generation methods [5]. However, these approaches need
accurate knowledge of the probability distribution of the cover
media, which is not feasible for empirical non-stationary media
such as images or videos.
In practical approaches, embedding is done while minimiz-
ing the caused distortion which can be formulated to a source
coding problem with a fidelity criterion [6]. One approach for
minimizing the distortion is to make very small changes in
spatial domain at the noise level. For example, one of the most
popular image steganography methods is altering the least
significant bit of pixels individually according to the hidden
message bits [7], [8]. However, because of the dependent noise
and pixel to pixel dependencies in images, it can be easily
detected [9]. So for achieving a better security, embedding
should be done in more complex textures or noisy areas rather
than smooth regions.
This has led to a group of spatial image steganography
methods that we call cost based algorithms. They have two
main steps, first is calculating the cost of embedding in each
pixel using a suitably defined distortion function, second is
embedding the message according to the costs. Second step
is solved for a rather general class of distortion functions
using syndrome trellis codes [10], [11]. As a result, the main
focus in cost based image steganography is on the first step,
deriving a cost function, for which we have proposed a new
approach in Section II-C. In the second step, we will employ
a method proposed in [12] which outperforms the commonly
used methodology for distributing the message among pixels.
Examples of cost based algorithms are HUGO [13], S-
UNIWARD [14] and HILL [15]. These methods utilize dif-
ferent ways for distortion calculation. HUGO defines the
distortion as a weighted sum of difference between SPAM
feature vector of a cover image and its stego version [16].
In spatial universal wavelet relative distortion (S-UNIWARD)
the embedding distortion is calculated using directional filter
banks. HILL uses a high-pass filter to find noisy parts in
an image, and then uses two low-pass filters to smooth the
calculated costs. We utilize a steganalyzer, a trained CNN [17],
to calculate pixel cost by measuring the network’s output for
different embedding patterns.
This paper is organized as follows. We introduce notations
and review the preliminaries and the problem formulation
in Section II. The proposed method is explained in Section
III. Results of comparative experiments are given in Section
IV to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
Conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. COST-BASED STEGANOGRAPHY
A. Notation
Capital and lower case bold face symbols are used for
matrices and vectors respectively. H is the entropy function
in bits, and all the logarithms are binary. E is the probability
expectation function.
B. Problem Formulation
We use X = (xij)
n1×n2 ∈ X = {0, . . . , 255}n1×n2 ,
set of all 8-bit gray-scale images of size n1 × n2, for
cover image. By assuming a ternary embedding scenario,
Y = (yij)
n1×n2 is the corresponding stego image, where
yij ∈ Iij = {max(0, xij − 1), xij ,min(255, xij + 1)}. As a
result, the embedding pattern can be defined as S = Y−X =
(sij)
n1×n2 ∈ S = {−1, 0,+1}n1×n2 , which is the coded
stego message using practical coding schemes as syndrome
trellis codes [10], and it is chosen according to the probability
distribution p(S).
In case of having a fixed relative payload, total number of
bits over the total number of pixels, the goal is first to define
a distance function D(X,Y) : X × X → R for calculating
embedding impact, then to solve the constrained optimization
problem below using the suitably defined function D.
argmin
p
E(D(X,Y)) = argmin
p
∑
S∈S
D(X,Y)× p(S) (1)
m = H(p) , −
∑
S∈S
p(S)× log
(
p(S)
)
(2)
where m is the length of the message in bits.
Below is the solution of this problem using Lagrangian
multipliers method [18]:
p(S) =
e−λD(S)∑
S∈S e
−λD(S)
(3)
where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier which can be determined
from (2). By assuming mutually independent and symmetrical
embedding impacts under an additive distortion scenario, a
reasonable assumption also made in HUGO, HILL and S-
UNIWARD, distance function can be written as below:
D(X,Y) =
n1∑
i=1
n2∑
j=1
ρij |xij − yij | (4)
where ρij is the embedding impact of changing only one
pixel by ±1 which is called the cost of embedding. This will
result in the following probability distribution for embedding
changes:
p(sij) =
{
e
−λρij
1+2e−λρij
if sij = ±1
1
1+2e−λρij
if sij = 0
(5)
The main design principle of the proposed method is using
steganalysis for steganography and calculating pixel costs(ρij).
C. Steganalysis-Based Steganography
Almost all state-of-the-art statistical steganalyzers (except
steganalyzers for LSB replacement) are based on calculating
steganalytic features and feeding them to a machine learning
algorithms. In steganalysis, steganalytic features are designed
to be more sensitive to embedding changes rather than dif-
ferences among covers. As a result, the learning algorithm
will be able to learn how the features will change in case
of embedding message regardless of the changes in features
for different covers. So from steganography point of view,
the features can serve as an image model to determine the
embedding costs ρij . This transition from steganalysis to a
steganographic model can be used with different steganalysis
methods and in different domains as well.
This idea has been previously done using SPAM features
[19] having a dimensionality of 686 in HUGO [13]. We believe
that using higher dimensional features will result in better
security than HUGO but it will be time consuming given the
fact that even HUGO is a very slow algorithm. One of the best
known steganalytic features are Spatial Rich Model features
(SRM) having a dimensionality of 34,671 [20]. Using these
features directly for developing an steganography algorithm
is almost impossible, given the size of these features, as
they have to be calculated for numerous different embedding
patterns for each cover media. Thus instead of using these
features, we are proposing using another steganlysis algo-
rithm which makes this task computationally feasible. The
steganalysis method uses a deep CNN shown in Figure 1
proposed by Xu et al. [17] and it outperforms the steganalysis
using ensemble classifier trained on SRM features [21]. After
training the CNN, the probabilty of being an stego message
is produced very fast for each input image. As a result,
this probability can be calculated many times for different
embedding patterns in each cover in a feasible time to estimate
the embedding costs ρij . This will be explained in details in
the following section.
III. METHODOLOGY
Lets assume that Xij+d , and Xij−d are the altered cover
images in which xij is changed by +d, and −d respectively.
By having the assumption of mutually independent embedding
impacts under an additive distortion scenario, ρ can be derived
for each pixel separately as the sensitivity of the image model
learned by CNN to changes in each pixel. It is to be noted that
the assumption gets highly violated once we start increasing
the payload. The sensitivity is estimated by second derivative
of the CNN’s output probability with respect to the pixel value
change.
ρij = max(
∂2 NNo(X)
∂x2ij
, 0) (6)
Where NNo, the output of the trained CNN, is the probability
of the image being a stego message. For estimating the second
derivative, the following finite difference formula with 4th
TABLE I
Out-of-Bag error (detection error) for payload=0.4 (bits per pixel) of the
proposed algorithm using different average filter sizes.
Average Filter 1× 1 3× 3 7× 7 13 × 13 21 × 21
EOOB 0.1821 0.2374 0.3091 0.3439 0.3265
order accuracy is used [22]:
∂2 NNo(X)
∂x2ij
≈
−NNo(Xij−2 )
12
+
4NNo(Xij−1 )
3
+
−5NNo(Xij)
2
+
4NNo(Xij+1 )
3
+
−NNo(Xij+2 )
12
(7)
The result of this step is then transformed to ρ’s by scaling
using linear mapping, and smoothing using an average filter.
Average filter also helps in compensating for the loss due to
the assumption of independent embedding impacts. Note that
the authors of HILL also used an average filter for smoothing
and it improved their algorithm using a certain size. Different
average filters with different sizes are tested and the results
are provided in Table I which will be discussed in the next
section. In addition to scaling and smoothing, embedding in
saturated pixels, pixels with 0 and 255 intensities, is totally
avoided by setting the corresponding ρ’s to a very high cost
[23]. By using the calculated ρ’s, although (5) is proven to be
the solution of (1), embedding probabilities are driven using
the following formula instead of (5), as it is shown to have a
better performance in [12].
p(sij) =
{
max(13 − λρij , 0) if sij = ±1
1− 2max(13 − λρij , 0) if sij = 0
(8)
Using this framework for calculating pixel costs and embed-
ding probabilities allows us to preserve the model utilized by
steganalysis and thus embed in a more secure way comparing
to other spatial image steganography algorithms.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
A. Main Configuration
Throughout this paper, all the experiments are conducted
on BOSSbase ver.1.01 database [24] containing 10,000 gray-
scale 512 × 512 pixels images. Performance evaluations are
done by an ensemble classifier steganalyzer [21] with a 10-fold
cross validation trained on 34,671 dimensional SRM feature
set. 5000 images are selected randomly in each experiment for
training/validation and 1000 images are selected from the rest
of the database for testing. Out-of-Bag Error is reported which
is the average false positive and negative rates in testing step.
B. Prior Work’s Configuration
For comparing the security of the proposed method, we have
used three state-of-the-art spatial steganography algorithms
with their best setting. HUGO is used with the same setting
reported in the original paper. S-UNIWARD algorithm is used
Fig. 1. Convolutional neural network architecture [17]
with σ = 1, shown to be optimum in [25]. HILL algorithm
is used with a 3 × 3 KerBohme high-pass filter and 15 × 15
averaging filters as low pass filters.
C. Convolutional Neural Network Configuration
The CNN used for calculating pixel costs is trained on
10000 images of BOSSbase ver.1.01 database [24] and their
stego versions using S-UNIWARD and HILL algortihm with
relative payload of 0.1, 0.4 (2500 images each, chosen ran-
domly without overlap). 8000 image pairs are used for training
and 2000 for validation. Every image and its stego version are
kept in the same batch, thus forming 64 images per batch. The
network has the same configuration and hyper parameters as
proposed in the original paper [17]. After training step, the
network has reached the validation accuracy of 69.81 percent.
Then the trained network is used to calculate cost matrices for
6000 images, and embedding is done using these matrices for
different relative payloads. Performance evaluation is done for
each payload as it is explained in IV-A.
D. Average Filter Size
Different average filter sizes are used for smoothing the
derivatives and transforming them to pixel costs. As it is
explained in Section III, averaging is done to smooth the
costs and compensate the violation of assuming mutually
independent costs in practice. The result of using different
average filters are compared in Table I, which shows 13× 13
average filter results in the highest security.
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Fig. 2. Out-of-Bag error (detection error) versus relative payload (bits per
pixel) of HILL, S-UNIWARD, HUGO and the proposed algorithms applied
on BOSSbase database ver. 1.01 calculated by an ensemble classifier trained
on SRM features.
E. Analysis
The comparison results are shown in Figure 2 which shows
higher performance of the proposed method comparing to
three other algorithms up to relative payload of 0.6 bits per
pixels. For higher payloads we observe performance drop.
We believe it is the result of violation of the assumption of
having mutually independent embedding impacts which we
assumed in both pixel cost calculation and embedding step.
This violation is more when the payload is higher because
of having a dense embedding pattern matrix S rather than a
sparse matrix which we have in low payloads. However the
other three methods only have this assumption in the second
step for deriving (5).
The results are also consistent with this statement as it can
be seen in Figure 2 that the proposed algorithm performs
better for a wide range of low payloads (0-0.62 bits per pixel)
but worse in high payloads (greater than 0.62 bits per pixel)
comparing to other algorithms.
V. CONCLUSIONS
A spatial image steganography method is presented which
outperforms the state-of-the-art algorithms in certain payloads
(0-0.62 bits per pixel). In this methodology, pixel costs are
calculated utilizing a trained steganalysis convolutional neural
network. Cost matrix is estimated by measuring the sensitivity
of the output of the network to each pixel’s intensity by
assuming mutually independent embedding impacts. Although
we compensate for the violation of this assumption in practice,
it causes low performance in high payloads (greater than 0.62
bits per pixel). We will try to find better compensation strate-
gies than average filtering in future. Another interesting future
work would be utilizing a more complex embedding pattern
than changing the image pixel by pixel for measuring the
embedding distortions which can also help in compensation.
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